We will, during this book review, examine the theories and predictions made by the author in 1973 and assess their relevance today. As we will see, many discussions about Russia remain pertinent even years later. We will identify patterns that were evident at the time and evaluate how they apply to the present.
Jan Vano Nanuashvili, born in 1901 in Tbilisi, Georgia, was a Georgian political activist and an officer in the Polish Army. His life was marked by significant historical events: he emigrated from Georgia after the Red Army occupied the Young Georgian Democratic Republic, became a German prisoner of war during the invasion of Poland, and later joined the Polish Army in Italy after being freed. After World War II, he lived in London before emigrating to the United States in 1951.
Nanuashvili dedicated his life to political activities against Soviet Russia and for the freedom and independence of his homeland. He founded various Georgian associations abroad and authored two notable books: “Power and Weakness of the Soviet Union” (1956) and “What Everyone in The Free World Should Know About Russia” (1973). He passed away in 1974 in San Francisco.
The author describes several theories that could explain Russia’s, or the Soviet Union’s, position within the world order. He argues that Europe has historically been the stage for a "struggle for the domination of the old continent." In all eras, imperialistic powers have clashed to control territories. On one side, there were the great powers: Prussia-Germany, Austro-Hungary, France, Great Britain, Russia - Russian Empire, and the Ottoman Empire. These powers frequently fought each other, with smaller nations caught in the middle. He refers to these as the "subjugated nations," defining them as “nations which suffered the most during wars for the continent, as the wars are fought primarily on their own soil" (p.51). An example is the Balkans, a region perpetually occupied by one empire or another, where soldiers were forced to fight for their invaders. As seen with the Serbs, who first fought against the Ottoman Empire, and less than 30 years later, had to defend it.
He concludes that “This situation suggests a very simple and clear conclusion. Freedom of nations is impossible as long as even one, no matter which, imperialistic power exists on the Continent. The existence of any aggressive power threatens each of the smaller nations equally, and they all must defend themselves in absolutely equal measure against all imperialistic powers of the Continent” (p.51). The author highlights that this imperialistic will can sometimes appear to benefit smaller nations: “In certain cases it might have seemed that one of the imperialistic powers, by crushing its opponent, acted in favor of the smaller nations. For instance, Russia allegedly fought for the liberation of the Balkan Slavs, Czechs, or other Christian nations, from the domination of Turkey and Austria, respectively. However, the end of World War II completely revealed Russia’s ultimate intentions with regard to all the ‘brother Slavs’ defended and liberated by her” (p.51).
For the author, the struggle for the control of the old continent was won by the USSR after World War II, as it remained the last continental superpower. Once this goal was achieved after centuries of conflict, the struggle shifted to world hegemony— “For world domination.” Throughout history, powers have sought to conquer Europe, while smaller nations were tossed back and forth between them.
According to the author, during the Second World War, “the Western democracies fought to preserve the world balance, to obtain conditions of lasting peace, and to ensure the continuance of the general principles of democracy and freedom” (p.72). On the other hand, “The Third Reich fought to obtain the hegemony over the old continent – a more concrete and far-reaching aim” (p.73), and “The USSR fought for world rule. Of all the belligerents, it had the most far-reaching and most concrete goal. This aim was openly propagated through the official ideology of that country” (p.73). It is the first big difference between the democratic powers and the authoritarian ones.
The author asserts that the leaders of the USSR were aware that “they must conquer farther objectives or their state will crumble even more quickly than it expanded. In such a situation, there is no room for persuasion and half-measures” (p.30). He explains that none of the great empires—Genghis Khan’s, the Arabs’, Bonaparte’s, or the Ottoman Empire—could stop their expansion. Once they did, the empires collapsed in.-to smaller entities. The USSR, and later Russia, won’t stop expanding either. These concepts of imperialism, the struggle for European domination, and ultimately, world domination, are essential to understanding the broader context of Russian history.
Analysis:
We will now proceed with the analysis. Several key themes emerge throughout the book, the first of which is the Western world's lack of preparedness regarding Russia's worldview. It appears that the West has a limited understanding of this perspective, and due to this knowledge gap, it failed to anticipate the confrontation.
“For a long time, they [the western world] did not realize either the Soviet aim or the methods, and to this day they have not worked out any methods or remedies against the Soviet Union’s pacific offensive” (p.16) and “This is actually because the Western nations actually do not know Russia. Their conception of her is built on the basis of official figures and propaganda given by Russia herself, which is the picture that Russia herself wishes to present.” (p.234)
It appears that the West made several political missteps. As noted in the book, “after World War I, it adopted a pacifist stance that did not result in any political consequences. Instead, it merely revealed that Western political leaders were unaware of what was happening in the territories of the former Russian Empire” (p. 288). These same mistakes were repeated after World War II. The postwar geopolitical situation reflected this, as “the Western nations, exhausted by the long war, immediately began to reorganize their lives around peace and their new neighbors” (p. 16).
This lack of understanding led to a significant issue: “Camp II [the West] does not know its adversary at all. It evaluates him solely based on his most recent actions. It neither understands his psychology nor his past and present mental development. The West categorically refuses to study the pages of his past, making it impossible to comprehend his current actions or devise solutions to counter them. This attitude grants the adversary invaluable advantages, giving him unrestricted political initiative, the freedom to choose any tactics, and the liberty to select the most opportune moments for successive attacks” (p. 24).
In stark contrast, “the Red Camp is fully aware of its ultimate objective, the effort required to achieve it, and the methods it must use. It never loses sight of its basic goal. It understands its adversary and his weaknesses intimately. It is fully aware of the psychological state and mindset of every component within the Western camp and can exploit this knowledge quickly and effectively. It knows how to adapt its offensive actions to each specific challenge and exploit every weak point of its opponent” (p. 24)
Throughout the modern history of the confrontation between the West and Russia—whether it was the Tsarist Russian Empire, the Soviet Union, or modern Russia—"the desire for peace, a real, lasting, and durable peace, has been a constant goal for the populations of every state and nation, and for humanity as a whole. This desire is particularly strong in the present generation” (p. 368). However, this longing for peace has often led to geopolitical blindness. This phenomenon is emphasized in Les Aveuglés : Comment Berlin et Paris ont laissé la voie libre à la Russie, a book by Sylvie Kauffman that details the significant errors made by modern Western diplomacy in dealing with contemporary Russia.
As seen today, “in some cases, the desire for peace takes the form of peace at any price, even at the cost of capitulation. Such an approach essentially means peace at the expense of peace itself”(p. 368)
With these points in mind, we must consider the consequences of this illusory way of perceiving Russia. As stated in the book, “These methods opened boundless horizons for the USSR and gave it the opportunity to achieve political successes that it could not attain through military force. This attitude among Western nations accelerated the pace and scope of the Red Camp’s aggression” (P. 16). We can clearly transfer this observation to the present day.
The critical question remains: “How can the successes of the Red Camp be explained? Such developments are made possible only by the passive attitude of the Western Camp. Just like in sports, a passive defensive stance invariably leads to catastrophe in both war and politics” (p. 27). “By trying to maintain the local status quo, prioritizing local peace at any cost, and passively avoiding successive strikes, the Western camp cannot possibly win the Cold War” (p. 27).
Although the Western world perceives the Cold War as having been won in 1991, for modern Russia, it was merely postponed. This becomes increasingly evident in light of today’s geopolitical landscape.
It is essential to understand that, in the author’s worldview, there is a constant struggle for hegemony. Initially, this battle centered around control of the European continent, but since World War II, it has expanded to the pursuit of global dominance. After the fall of the USSR, we witnessed the collapse of bipolarity, and in the Western mindset, the United States emerged as the sole hegemon. However, in recent years, previously insignificant Third World countries—marginalized during the first Cold War due to colonialism and internal struggles—have been striving to find their place on the global stage.
Modern Russia—Putin's Russia—still refuses to accept the loss of its former dominance and instead advocates for a multipolar world, where global power is shared among major nations. During the Cold War, this contest was confined to just the Soviet Union and the United States. As the author notes, “The ideal of the USSR is world domination. It has employed every possible means to realize this goal, and to achieve it, it organized War Camp I, the Red Camp. Remarkably, its greatest advances and most successful aggressions have occurred during times of peace.” (p. 94)
The author further explains, “(1) The struggle continues for the same objective—penetration into the West—that Ivan the Terrible initiated. (2) The Russians conduct their strategy according to the patterns established by Catherine the Great and Nicholas I. (3) Slightly more than a year before that war, it was necessary to sacrifice millions of lives and expend countless tons of iron to gain only a few miles in Europe” (p. 153). This is echoed in the ongoing Ukrainian conflict since 2014, where Russia has expended billions of rubles without making significant advances into the West.
Historically, Russia has often avoided overt military force, opting instead for more subtle, peaceful means of expanding its influence. “Russia has always had two faces: an official one for the outside world, projecting the image it wants to convey within the framework of official figures, and the other, its true face, which must be studied and unmasked.” (p. 246)
This theme can be described as Russia’s silent conquest, encompassing all methods of interference in sovereign foreign governments with the ultimate aim of gaining control over the state. We saw this during the Cold War with the establishment of “puppet governments which Moscow introduced into satellite countries after 1945. The members of the first governments in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria were eliminated because they sought genuine independence” (p. 170)
In more contemporary times, we see Russia’s foreign policy and interference actively at work in former Soviet states. This is most evident in Ukraine and Georgia—both in the past and with the current Georgian Dream government—as well as in Central Asia, Moldova, and Armenia – Azerbaijani conflict.
But the situation is more complex, and to fully understand it, we must look back into history to see how Russia's silent conquest operates. The author defines these actions as “political conquests realized in times of peace” (p. 106). This is an area of study that is often overlooked in contemporary Western analysis. As the author notes, “In Russia’s history, the cold war actually has a tradition spanning 400 years. Its theory and principles are precise, clearly established, and no secret to anyone willing to study them” (p. 106).
The author provides two historical examples to explain this tradition of Russian silent or peaceful conquest. In 1519, Russia placed its candidate, Shah Ali, on the throne of Kazan. Although the Tatars removed this Russian agent in 1521, by 1551, with the support of Muscovite armies, Shah Ali was reinstated (p. 107). This eventually led to Russia's full control over the Kazan Khanate.
A similar pattern unfolded to the south with the Astrakhan Khanate, where Russia sought to gain control over the Volga River. “In 1554, Russia installed its candidate, Derbish Ali, on the throne, strategically bringing the state to ruin. By 1556, Russian forces ceremoniously entered Astrakhan and annexed it to Moscow” (p. 108). What is particularly interesting about these conquests is that Russian armies did not have to engage in significant combat. The military's role was largely ceremonial: “The work of political conquest was meticulously planned and executed. The only task left for the armed forces was a symbolic occupation of the politically nonexistent capital of a dissolved state.” (p. 109)
Legend even holds that the Astrakhan Khanate itself requested Moscow’s help, highlighting Russia's ability to engineer such outcomes. This is “the first example of a political tradition that Russia esteems and follows to this day.” (p. 108)
"Official Russian history refers to these individuals as swemi stawlennikami, a term that journalists today might equate with puppets. However, the Russian term describes their role and function much more accurately. In translation, stawlennik means more than just puppet. It refers to an individual who, even before the arrival of Muscovite authority, actively promotes Russia’s cause and sees themselves as a representative of Moscow in a country that will eventually be invaded. The difference between a stawlennik and a puppet,” the author explains, “is that the puppet usually emerges after the country has already been occupied by the Red Army. The stawlennik, on the other hand, operates within his country before it has fallen, working to create such a state of anarchy that Moscow’s armed forces can occupy the territory without battle, often at the state's own request.” (p. 108-109)
It is crucial to understand that “the reign of Ivan the Terrible is of particular interest today because many of the contemporary political traits of Russia, which astonish the world, crystallized into established traditions and principles during his rule (p. 112). This historical context is important when analyzing Putin's rhetoric about a Great Russia, as he often refers back to Ivan the Terrible, a figure we will explore further later.
One of the reasons behind Russia’s approach to conquest is that “the political leaders of Russia have always trusted their armed forces, but their primary method of achieving expansionist aims has been through the “cold war.” This is why Russia never overestimates her strength.” (p. 126) There have been rare instances of overestimation, such as in 1582 during the Livonian War, where “the armies of Moscow suffered a debacle.” (p. 111) Nevertheless, Russia still managed to “secure peace in a simpler way without risking her political prestige.” (p. 111)
Looking more closely at the events of the last century, we see that “a chronological analysis of all Soviet moves reveals that the Bolsheviks followed the traditions of Tsarist Russia.” (p. 137) This pattern continues in Putin’s Russia today, where the same historical tactics and principles are still in play.
Modern Russia continues to employ an old tactic from its past: the altruistic pretext of defending foreign citizens from alleged lawlessness. This was notably used as the justification when “Russian armies once again entered Poland in 1792, claiming to protect Polish citizens from the chaos caused by new reforms.” (p. 114-115) As the author points out, “the Russian army must always be "summoned by the oppressed," by the population of the invaded country.” (p. 115)
This tactic is veiled under terms like liberation and unification, but these words are used to mask actions that are actually counter to their accepted definitions. “The USSR often concealed its acts of aggression behind the façade of "liberation" and “unification”” (p. 375), a strategy that remains relevant in the rhetoric of modern Russia today.
This rhetoric is not new; it extends beyond the Cold War and the Russian aggressions in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Ukraine, all framed under the guise of “saving oppressed Russians.” While the language may have evolved with changing contexts, the underlying theme of a savior remains constant.
To understand the national identity of Russia, we must recognize that this has become a significant issue since the fall of the Soviet Union. Over the past two decades, there has been what can be termed a rehabilitation of various political and historical figures in Russia, notably Joseph Stalin. Polls conducted by the Levada Center show a marked shift in public perception from 2000 to 2018, with a substantial portion of society now viewing Stalin as “a wise leader who brought the USSR to power and prosperity.”
However, this rehabilitation of controversial figures is not a recent phenomenon. The author argues that “the Bolshevik system recognizes only those rulers in Russian history who achieved the greatest conquests. The only monarchs who were forgiven by the Bolsheviks and counted among the Red saints are Ivan the Terrible, Peter the Great, and Catherine II—those who accomplished the most significant territorial expansions” (p. 180).
In contemporary propaganda, Stalin is similarly depicted as a great conqueror and a key figure in restoring a Great Russia. The author explains that this recognition of historical figures as great is rooted in their conquests, leading to the conclusion that the essence of the Russian nation is to “rule the world; her ideology is conquest—conquest without respite and at any price.' The national strategy employed to achieve these goals is described as the “cold war.” After dismantling and destabilizing each victim, Russia can then seize them with ease. Today, the remaining vestiges of the free world are the target of this ongoing cold war, which Russia conducts to achieve its ultimate objectives.” (p. 198)
This underscores the need for European governments to delve deeper into Russian history to grasp the underlying mindset. The author notes, “If the appropriate departments in the West had dedicated themselves to studying each typical war and cold war previously conducted by Russia with the same rigor as they do military science, they would have spared their countries many surprises. They could have anticipated at least some developments and prevented numerous maneuvers by the adversary.” (p. 199)
We now turn to another crucial topic: the totalitarian regime in Russia. The author argues that “totalitarianism, as a national system in Russia, was born and has endured solely due to the fervent conquest that has characterized that nation. The unusually rapid and persistent territorial expansion of Russia has created continuous pressure for the swift absorption of each conquest, pushing for immediate action toward new conquests and the exploitation of opportunities arising from the latest gains.” (p. 207)
This establishes a direct link between Russia's imperialistic tendencies and its authoritarian regime. The author asserts that “even a superficial examination of Russian history reveals that without a totalitarian system, such aggressive actions and rapid territorial growth would be impossible” (p. 208). Moreover, “the constant and progressively external aggression, continually gaining in strength, has necessitated the maintenance of the totalitarian system for as long as this aggression proved successful.” (p. 208)
This leads the author to conclude that Soviet Russia, governed as a totalitarian regime, remained engaged in a struggle for global hegemony. He states, “Political events have repeatedly and explicitly emphasized that the Kremlin is not interested in spreading the idea of communism worldwide, but in establishing a Moscow-style communism with Russian supremacy over the globe.” (p. 208). This underscores the enduring connection between imperialism and authoritarian power.
For the author, totalitarianism is synonymous with imperialistic views of the world, which explains why Soviet Russia sought to expand its influence. In today's context, we can observe that modern Russia, under Putin's authoritarian regime, exhibits similar neo-imperialistic ambitions. This is particularly evident in the pursuit of a Great Russia and the establishment of the Eurasian Union, which can be seen as a form of neo-imperialism, where member countries would be expected to cede some of their sovereignty to Moscow.
In the 1960s, the press was already grappling with the question, “What will Russia do next?” The prevailing answer at that time was, “Nothing. She will continue her old and well-developed cold war. Currently, she is lulling Western capitals to sleep, harassing them in Africa, and outmaneuvering them in Asia.” (p. 199)
Today, as we observe rising geopolitical tensions, we can draw parallels between the theories and predictions made by the author and the current world situation. Over the past two decades, Russia has engaged in these silent invasions, beginning with Georgia, followed by its actions in Ukraine. While the initial attempts to assert control in Ukraine were thwarted by the Maidan protests, Crimea ultimately voted to rejoin Russia.
Additionally, we can reflect on the historical example of Armenia, particularly before the recent Nagorno-Karabakh tensions, where Russia's non-intervention—despite having troops stationed there for peacekeeping—strained relations between the two countries. Similarly, Belarus under Lukashenko exemplifies this trend. Georgia, under Ivanishvili, seems to be following a similar path and risks becoming another Belarus in the region.
"For those familiar with Russia, the trajectory of its tactical maneuvers is quite evident: today, Russia's primary objective is to divert the West from considering active resistance and armed defense of its political positions at any cost. The author identifies three strategies employed to achieve this goal: (1) sedating the West with various agreements and tempting prospects of harmonious coexistence; (2) instilling fear through the threat of nuclear war; and (3) instigating violent conflicts in regions where the West is already weakened by prolonged engagements against formidable adversaries. Unfortunately, these tactics yield results beyond expectations, leading Russia to see no reason to alter or abandon its approach." (p. 216)
Given the current situation in Ukraine, it is clear that Putin's Russia must be confronted. As analyzed here, Russia has consistently pursued hegemony, from its early history to the modern era. Recognizing this pattern is crucial for understanding how to respond effectively.
However, the author cautions that "for the progress of mankind, it is essential that the Russian nation be integrated into the family of free nations without suffering a severe setback in its desperate struggle to salvage a doomed empire." (p. 384) History teaches us that, as seen with Germany after World War II, humiliation can breed resentment among the Russian people, which may exacerbate anti-Western sentiments and potentially lead to a new cold war.
If the West emerges victorious in this confrontation, it will need to invest considerable effort into rebuilding its relationship with a future Russia, fostering a new world order that includes all nations in a multipolar framework.
Louis Sandro Zarandia
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