" What Russia needs is a capitulation, a true humiliation, so that most Russians will understand that they must rethink and denounce Putin." – This article will challenge a prevalent argument commonly found in discussions.
We must acknowledge that this is a highly controversial title for an opinion article. Nevertheless, it reflects an approach we've often encountered: the generalization of a diverse community—comprising various ethnicities, viewpoints, and millions of individuals—into a single, monolithic perspective. This kind of simplification is prevalent today, as it makes it easier to explain complex or inaccessible theories when addressing a large, diverse audience.
This kind of simplification can be useful in certain fields of International Relations, such as economics, where concepts like the Efficient Market Hypothesis assume that all investors think similarly about value and base their decisions on the same information. However, in political science or social sciences, oversimplifying such a diverse group is problematic, especially in the current context. The situation is too complex to assume that an entire population moves, thinks, and acts as one. Such assertions can be dangerous, as they risk overlooking crucial aspects of reality. Naturally, this could alter how some facts are perceived and analyzed.
In today’s world, we are accustomed to the extreme simplification of the information we receive. In this opinion article, we aim to add complexity to the discussion by incorporating historical, theoretical, and political context. Our goal is to introduce a third dimension to the prevailing two-dimensional rhetoric. While we recognize that this is a deeply emotional subject, it is essential to explore it thoroughly to prevent potential future mistakes or misinterpretations.
We will begin by addressing the statement that all Russians are to blame for the ongoing situation. First, we should revisit a particular scandal that overshadowed the Venice Biennale earlier in September: the release of the film titled Russian at War. We won't delve too deeply into the details, but the film portrays ordinary Russians forced into the conflict against Ukraine. The director, a Russian-Canadian national, traveled to the front lines in the Donetsk region from the Russian side. The film was met with backlash from Ukrainian officials and critics, as it appears to victimize soldiers and provide a misleading justification for their actions on the front lines and in occupied territories.
The perspective of Ukrainian officials and critics is understandable; how should they respond to a film presented at a festival as prestigious as the Venice Biennale that claims, “ not all Russians ”? In the current tense climate in Europe, marked by a lack of Western support and dwindling public backing, such a film can be seen as detrimental publicity. However, we must avoid falling into the trap of generalization. While the phrase “ not all Russians ” may resemble the sentiment of “ not all men ”, the focus of this article is to explore the gray areas rather than simply accepting a black-and-white narrative.
Now, let’s delve deeper into the notion of “ not all Russians .” It's important to emphasize that Russia is home to 144 million inhabitants, who come from diverse social classes (Anikin et al., 2017; Gerber & Gimpelson, 2024). While the primary aim of the Soviet Union and the Bolshevik Revolution was to bridge the social gaps created during the Russian Empire under the tsars, we can confidently assert that this goal was not fully achieved, even during the Soviet era. Following its collapse, the open market attracted the vultures of capitalism, leading to the emergence of stark social class disparities.
Modern Russia is characterized by a range of social classes, and we will explore them now. For the purpose of this discussion, we will categorize them from top to bottom. At the pinnacle is the political class, with Putin potentially being the most powerful individual in the country. The upper echelons of society depend heavily on his judgments regarding their collaborators. Next, we have the oligarchs, who are both victims and beneficiaries of Putin’s regime. While they possess significant wealth and influence, they are never truly safe from Putin's disfavor or potential reprisals (Guttermann, 2024). To maintain their status, they must navigate his expectations carefully. Below them are various political figures—politicians, ministers, and intellectuals—who remain entirely at Putin’s mercy, even if some may hold their own perspectives on current affairs.
Further down the social spectrum, distinctions arise, particularly based on geographic location. Generally, residents of Moscow and Saint Petersburg enjoy a higher standard of living compared to those in smaller cities, and undoubtedly, they fare better than individuals living in rural areas. However, we must clarify what we mean by “ living standards .” We define it as the potential for personal development—a Western perspective on the empowerment of individuals within the population. This encompasses various indices of human empowerment, including political representation, mental and physical health, educational and professional training, economic opportunity, and access to culture and sports. It is well known that not all segments of society achieve these indices.
The most crucial factor is education, or the opportunity to shape one’s future. Rural areas face numerous challenges, and only a small portion of residents can afford to migrate to other parts of the country in search of work. Additionally, rural communities struggle with a lack of social infrastructure, poor quality of education, and limited political representation.
Regarding political representation, it's important to highlight how poorly informed the Russian masses are about their political rights. It's often said that Russians lack interest in politics, a perception that can be oversimplified (Volkov & Kolesnikov, 2023). Looking back, Tsarist Russia was one of the last societies still rooted in a serf and bourgeois culture. Legend has it that during Russia's counteroffensive against Napoleon, when his armies advanced into Western Europe, young bourgeois officers in the upper echelons of the military realized that slavery had ended in Europe and that peasants were now free. This moment may have catalyzed the first Decembrist revolts in 1825. Notably, throughout Russian history, revolutions have rarely emerged from the lower classes, as was the case in France and other parts of Europe. Instead, they have typically been spearheaded by the upper classes, particularly the intelligentsia.
The high level of political engagement in the Western world is, of course, a result of the robust democratic systems we have in place. Russia has never experienced such democracy, despite claims made during the Soviet era and by Yeltsin's administration. It’s easy to criticize the Russian population for their inaction, but we must remember that understanding politics and rights requires education on these topics, much like in Western Europe. Democracy, often taken for granted by some, is a complex concept that necessitates understanding and learning (Holmqvist Olander & Sandberg, 2013).
Of course, for such discussions to take place, freedom of speech must be upheld, which is no longer the case in Russia. The opposition is silenced by the authorities, and only one narrative is permitted to circulate. The power rhetoric dominates the national discourse. On television, in radio broadcasts, and in newspapers, the official narrative prevails. Putin's rhetoric has permeated every aspect of media for the past 25 years. Under such conditions, it is entirely human for people to accept this rhetoric as truth. If critical thinking is not permitted, how can we expect any different?
Indeed, one could argue that in today’s world, we have access to global information through the internet and social media. However, this is not the case in Russia, where the dominant social media platforms are not widely used in the Western world, and vice versa. This disparity limits the flow of diverse perspectives and reinforces the existing narratives within the country.
Blaming the population of Russia for passively following the power rhetoric is as misguided as blaming a child for being apolitical. Such accusations can be viewed as neo-colonialist and reflect a profound misunderstanding of the cultural complexities at play.
Certainly, some individuals have attempted to oppose the government, and we should avoid generalizations that suggest no Russians are educated enough to understand politics. However, one major challenge is the repression. As we saw with Navalny, a prominent opponent who died in prison, many in the opposition have faced dire consequences. Today, it has become too dangerous to stand against the power, and even more perilous to voice dissent openly.
This brings us to the final significant category of Russians: those living abroad. Even this group can be subdivided. First, there are the political opponents who emigrate due to state pressure. They are not safe even outside of Russia; for example, Maksim Kuzminov was killed in Spain after surrendering to Ukrainian military forces in 2023 . Many Russian dissidents who spoke out following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022 have faced threats against thems Irina Dolinina et Alesya Marokhovskaya, who also received threats in 2023 when they were living in Prague.
Another group of Russians abroad comprises conscientious objectors who fled not immediately after the full-scale invasion in 2022, but in 2023, when Russia began drafting individuals. This category should not be blamed for cowardice, even though they may face cold receptions in some countries. For example, in Georgia, they are sometimes viewed as a new form of colonization by Russia.
The final group consists of those close to the power, who are outside the country due to the economic situation but still support Russian politics. While some might argue that a larger percentage of the diaspora votes in favor of Putin's government (Huskey, 2024) —this could be true, but it may also be manipulated. Regardless, the majority of Russians living abroad feel powerless to oppose their government in Russia. Some of them have even lost the right to return to the country.
Now, let's consider the military aspect of society. As previously mentioned, some rural regions offer limited opportunities for their populations. Enlistment in the army can provide substantial financial benefits, making it sometimes more appealing for individuals to risk their lives in war to secure a better future for their families.
Some soldiers are recruited from prisons, with the promise of being released after 6 months —though currently, new recruits may only gain freedom at the end of the war. While some enlisted individuals genuinely believe in the conflict , another important question arises: where do we draw the line between believing in the conflict due to propaganda and holding informed beliefs? This is a challenging parameter to assess.
Indeed, soldiers bear responsibility for their actions, with some having caused more civilian casualties than others. Not all soldiers hold the same level of accountability in the conflict. Can we assert that a Russian soldier killing a Ukrainian in Ukraine bears greater responsibility than a Russian soldier doing the same in the Kursk Region? This is a complex question that requires extensive analysis, as well as an institutional process and judgment akin to that of the Nuremberg Trials.
We believe we've thoroughly explored the question of blaming all Russians for the ongoing war in Ukraine. Now, we can shift our focus to the second question: the theme of humiliation.
This is, once again, a highly controversial topic with arguments on both sides. We will explore these perspectives to better understand the connections between past and present, and how humiliation shapes current events.
Humiliation—really? Haven’t we learned from the last century what happens when a country, its people, and its leaders are humiliated? The 20th century was a challenging era in European history, marked by momentous events and profound lessons. From the World Wars, the collapse of empires, the Bolshevik Revolution, and the Cold War, to the processes of colonization and decolonization, the European continent—and its powers—were deeply shaken. While these events now belong to history, they still offer critical insights into today’s world and policies.
For the purpose of this discussion, we will focus on several key historical moments. First, we will examine Germany's humiliation after World War I. Then, we will briefly touch on the process of European integration and how it served as an antidote to humiliation. We will also delve into one of the century's greatest humiliations—the fall of the Soviet Union—and how it influences Putin’s policies today. Finally, we will conclude with a brief exploration of the concept of the common European home as a potential vision for future European and Eurasian relations.
Humiliation is a complex theme that requires careful analysis to fully integrate into our theoretical framework. In this article, we will rely on widely understood concepts, assuming the reader has the necessary background knowledge to follow the discussion.
Germany's humiliation after World War I is a well-documented subject, and while we won't explore it in depth, its significance cannot be overlooked. The defeat, along with the heavy reparations imposed on Germany, played a crucial role in the rise of populism and served as a catalyst for Hitler’s propaganda. The populist movement of the late 1920s intensified due to the economic recession that followed the 1929 stock market crash, exacerbating feelings of humiliation and injustice among the German people and the state. Much of this sentiment centered on the loss of national power and prestige, as well as the widespread resentment towards the Treaty of Versailles.
It is widely understood that Germany's humiliation—stemming from monetary reparations, resource depletion, and territorial losses—contributed significantly to the rise of national populism in the country, providing Adolf Hitler with an opportunity to seize power.
We should now shift our focus to the end of the Second World War. This conflict, as we know, was devastating and resulted in immense loss of life. Nazi Germany was ultimately defeated by the Allied forces, leading to an armistice following Adolf Hitler's eventual suicide.
However, the allied – the western world – approached history differently this time, and Germany was not subjected to the same humiliation as it had been after the Treaty of Versailles. For various political reasons, the country was divided into two by the Allied powers. With the onset of the Cold War, the focus shifted more towards geopolitical tensions and confrontation than on the humiliation of the defeated nation. Nevertheless, Nazi leaders were held accountable during the Nuremberg Trials, which continue to resonate today. These trials convicted 161 officials, with 37 receiving the death penalty. No further humiliation was deemed necessary, as Germany was already in ruins, and the lessons learned from the previous peace treaty had been acknowledged by the allied officials.
Western officials concluded that the German people had already suffered enough during the war, enduring destruction and bombings on their own soil. Drawing a parallel with modern Russia, at that time the German population had very limited access to foreign news, and attempting to listen to independent radio stations was perilous. The primary source of information was the government and its propaganda. This situation mirrors the current climate in Putin’s Russia, where numerous social media platforms, media outlets, and newspapers are banned. The primary information channel remains state propaganda, making it challenging to hold all Russians accountable for the ongoing full-scale invasion of Ukraine, just as it was difficult to blame all Germans for the Second World War and the resulting genocides.
The Cold War confrontation provided a fertile ground for the empowerment of Western nations. In fact, the European Union emerged as a response to the post-war landscape and the "never again" rhetoric . It aimed to promote lasting reconciliation between France and Germany by fostering economic growth and ensuring military security. Additionally, it sought to encourage a sense of brotherhood among the people of these countries, under the belief that individuals who know each other are less likely to engage in conflict. This initiative also aimed to prevent any single power from dominating Europe, which had been the cause of previous wars between France and Germany..
Did it succeed? Today, it is hard to believe that Germany and France were once bitter enemies. Their cooperation is now robust, and the bonds between their peoples are strong. Within the European Union, the notion of war occurring within its borders is virtually unimaginable. Despite some internal disagreements, Europe continues to function as a well-knit brotherhood. The idea of a common European home —a motto of European integration—was famously articulated by Gorbachev during perestroika (Carrère d’Encausse, 2019). This vision of greater cooperation among European nations in economic, social, and cultural domains transformed the mindset of European leaders. War is no longer on the agenda; instead, the focus is on peace, social integration, and building a better future.
In a sense, we could argue that the Marshall Plan and subsequent European integration revitalized relations on the continent, shifting the mindset from European hegemony to a focus on global peace. However, this global peace has faced challenges with the rise of Putin’s Russia, highlighting the need to reformulate the last statement: it represents a global peace among Western nations that often overlooked the importance of integrating Russia.
Now, we arrive at the second part of the theme of humiliation: the humiliation of Russia. According to the Russian narrative, the European powers, collectively referred to as "The West," have humiliated Russia on multiple occasions, which has contributed to the resurgence of Cold War tensions over the past two decades.
We will now describe this humiliation focusing on some of the key events. For a broader analyze we will publish another article on that particular thematic. The first significant humiliation for present-day Russia was the loss of power following the fall of the Soviet Union. Diplomats from Moscow transitioned from representatives of one of the world’s two superpowers to representatives of a fractured and crumbling Russia (Carrère d’Encausse, 2019; Tinguy, 2022). They moved from a position of being feared and respected to one where they became the subject of ridicule.
Modern Russia has convinced itself that it was their efforts that helped defeat Bolshevism and the Soviet Union (Fédorovski & Méritens, 2017). However, this narrative contrasts sharply with that of the United States, which clearly views itself as the victor of the Cold War, as articulated in Francis Fukuyama's book, The End of History (1989). This perception represents a humiliation for the Russian state, which believed it was no longer regarded as the number one bis.
The end of the Cold War for the United States of America rhyme with the world hegemony, which for Russian Federation wasn’t the case as it was seen as the implantation of a new World order, which opened for a multipolar hegemony.
These difficulties in mutual understanding have led to a misinterpretation of history and subsequent events in the following years. While Russia was confident that it would be regarded as an equal by Western powers, it quickly became apparent that they did not view Russia as one of them. Several turning points can be identified in this narrative (Carrère d’Encausse, 2019; Fédorovski & Méritens, 2017; Tinguy, 2022): the interventions in Serbia without consulting Moscow, the U.S. invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan against the will of the Security Council, and most recently, the assassination of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya. Additionally, a series of events, such as the failed economic reforms during Boris Yeltsin’s early years in power, are now portrayed by Russian propaganda as attempts to weaken Russia. Similarly, the color revolutions in post-Soviet countries are viewed as efforts to extend Western influence further eastward and undermine Russia's power over these nations. This is just a small sample of the events and reasons that are currently employed in Kremlin propaganda.
We won’t spend more time on this particular subject, as another article will address this theme in greater detail. Now, we should shift our focus to the present situation in Ukraine. In our view, the theme of humiliation has no place in current policies regarding the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The potential victory of Ukraine as a defender of Western democratic values is a separate discussion. Here, we are specifically debating the end of the conflict in the event of a Ukrainian victory over the Russian state.
When Ukraine triumphs over the Russian state, it will be a moment of reflection. Should we humiliate Russia? Should we demand that Russia pay for all the destruction it caused during the years of conflict? Many voices will likely advocate for this course of action. The desire for revenge is a natural human emotion, and such sentiments would be understandable.
At that moment, it will be crucial to understand history correctly. Based on the insights discussed in this article, we can confidently state that if Russia is humiliated, any resulting peace will be temporary—much like the aftermath of Germany's defeat in World War I. Humiliating Russia will only sow the seeds of future conflict. It may not happen today or tomorrow, but such actions will inevitably fuel further confrontation and deepen resentment over time.
In our view, we should strive for a more peaceful future. To be clear, when we speak of peace, we refer to a scenario in which Ukraine emerges victorious in the confrontation. This paper does not, in any way, support a frozen conflict resolution, which would merely delay future hostilities. Our discussion focuses on the outcome of a decisive victory, with one clear winner and one clear loser.
That said, we return to the idea of a peaceful future. In the event that Ukraine wins the war against Russia, it is hard to imagine a scenario where Russia does not suffer significant damage—in terms of population, infrastructure, and widespread destruction. The Western world should aim for a future based on cooperation, much like the European Union's post-World War II vision. Building a future grounded in cooperation, development, culture, and a collective effort to preserve historical memory—similar to how Germany addressed the Holocaust through museums, educational projects, and public debates—will foster greater democratization in Russia and the post-Soviet Eastern countries. However, such a vision often overlooks the capitalist perspective and the challenges related to money and power.
For those who argue that a peaceful post-war settlement without humiliation won’t work—citing the possibility of Russian families, impacted by the loss of a son, husband, or father during the war, seeking revenge—it is a valid and thought-provoking argument. However, if we look at history, did the Germans seek revenge after the Second World War? The answer is no, and this serves as a key example of how a path focused on reconciliation, rather than humiliation, can prevent future conflict.
The purpose of this article was to clarify the distinction between the responsibilities of the Russian political and economic elites and those of the Russian people. As we argued in the first part, not all Russians share the same level of responsibility for the actions of their government. It would be wrong to claim that all are to blame, just as it would be inaccurate to say that none bear any responsibility. For the reasons outlined in our argument, we believe it is untenable to support the idea that Russia should be humiliated as a form of punishment. Such an approach, as we’ve explained, could be dangerously misused in the future.
The power structure in Russia—including the political, military, and economic elites—should be held accountable once the war is over. We would need a trial akin to the Nuremberg Trials to address their actions. Vengeance in the form of humiliation will not restore the lives lost or undo the destruction suffered by Ukraine. Instead, it would only provide fuel for a future Russian government to exploit as a means of reinforcing a resurgence of patriotic and nationalist sentiments. This, in turn, could lead to another confrontation in the future, whether as a direct conflict or a renewed cold war.
As we have discussed in this paper, the Russian people are heavily influenced by propaganda, leaving many with limited opportunities to consider alternative viewpoints or engage in critical thinking. This situation is reminiscent of Nazi Germany, where propaganda gradually shifted following the denazification program (Entnazifizierung) implemented between the end of the war and 1951. A similar process of "de-Putinization" could potentially be worth considering in addressing the current challenges in Russia.
In conclusion, the question of whether all Russian citizens should bear blame for the ongoing conflict in Ukraine is complex and multifaceted. Simplifying this issue into a binary perspective overlooks the diversity of experiences, opinions, and social realities within Russia. By recognizing the various social classes, levels of political engagement, and the historical context that shapes contemporary Russian society, we gain a deeper understanding of the challenges faced by individuals living under Putin’s regime.
While it is essential to hold the Russian state accountable for its actions, - by means the political and military spheres – It is equally crucial to approach the population with nuance and empathy. The call for reparations and consequences, including humiliation, must be carefully considered, as collective punishment could further entrench divisions and hinder future reconciliation efforts. A just resolution to this conflict requires not only accountability but also a commitment to fostering dialogue and understanding among all parties involved. Only through this nuanced approach can we hope to move towards a more peaceful and equitable future for Ukraine and its people, while also addressing the complexities of Russian society.
We should not idealize the concept of a common European home, as its implementation may differ significantly between Russia and Europe compared to the historical relationships between France and Germany. Additionally, our focus has primarily been on the major powers, often overlooking the small states that find themselves caught in between. However, we believe that improved relations between the West and Russia could foster development in these smaller countries, allowing them to avoid the need to navigate a specific hegemonic influence.
Moreover, the situation in Ukraine warrants further analysis, particularly since Ukraine currently bears the brunt of the conflict's impact. It is essential that Ukraine has a voice in the negotiations moving forward. Throughout this discussion, we must also remain aware of the differing perspectives held by countries outside of our own, as their experiences and viewpoints may not align with those in Western world.
Louis Sandro Zarandia
Bibliographie:
Anikin, V. A., Lezhnina, Y. P., Mareeva, S. V., & Tikhonovv, N. N. (2017). Social Stratification by Life Chances: Evidence from Russia. SSRN Electronic Journal. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3093022
Carrère d’Encausse, H. (2019). Six années qui ont changé le monde: 1985-1991, la chute de l’Empire soviétique. Pluriel.
Fédorovski, V., & Méritens, P. de. (2017). Poutine de A à Z. Stock.
Gerber, T. P., & Gimpelson, V. (2024). Inequality and social stratification in Russia during the Putin regime: From market transition to war on Ukraine. Sociology Compass, 18(3), e13196. https://doi.org/10.1111/soc4.13196
Guttermann, S. (2024). The List Is Long: Russians Who Have Died After Running Afoul Of The Kremlin. RadioFreeEurope RadioLiberty. https://www.rferl.org/a/enemies-kremlin-deaths-prigozhin-list/32562583.html
Holmqvist Olander, M., & Sandberg, B. (2013). Teaching democracy – a complex object of learning. International Journal for Lesson and Learning Studies, 2(3), 281–299. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJLLS-01-2013-0005
Huskey, E. (2024). Will Russian Voters Abroad Support Putin in the Upcoming Presidential Election? PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 880. https://www.ponarseurasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/Pepm_880_Huskey_March2024.pdf
Tinguy, A. de. (2022). Le géant empêtré: La Russie et le monde de la fin de l’URSS à l’invasion de l’Ukraine. Perrin.
Volkov, D., & Kolesnikov, A. (2023). Alternate Reality: How Russian Society Learned to Stop Worrying About the War. Carnegie Russia Eurasia Center. https://carnegieendowment.org/research/2023/11/alternate-reality-how-russian-society-learned-to-stop-worrying-about-the-war?lang=en
EN 
FR